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This paper examines the extent to which the position of the medical profession and the state 5 
towards complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) practitioners has changed since the 6 
late 1990s, taking Portugal as a case study. Using Light’s concept of countervailing powers, 7 
we consider the alliances, interests, rhetoric and degrees of control between these three actors 8 
over time, focusing particularly on the extent to which CAM practitioners have acted as a 9 
countervailing force in their relationship with the medical profession and the state. It also 10 
brings to the fore the position of supra-state agencies concerning CAM regulation. A critical 11 
discourse analysis was conducted on data derived from a systematic search of information 12 
dating from the late 1990s up to 2015. Our analysis suggests that CAM has emerged as an 13 
active player and a countervailing power in that it has had significant influence on the process 14 
of state policy-making. The medical profession, in turn, has moved from rejecting to 15 
‘incorporating’ CAM, while the state has acted as a ‘broker’, trying to accommodate the 16 
demands and preferences of both actors while simultaneously demonstrating its power and 17 
autonomy in shaping health policy. In sum, the history of countermoves of CAM, the medical 18 
profession and the state in recasting power relations regarding CAM regulation in Portugal 19 
has highlighted the explanatory value of Light’s countervailing power theory and the need to 20 
move away from a professional dominance and corporatist approach, in which CAM has 21 
simply been seen as subjugated to the power of the medical profession and the state. 22 
 23 
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 1. Introduction 27 
In recent years complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) has achieved greater state 28 
legitimacy in Western society. Acupuncture, homeopathy, osteopathy, chiropractic, 29 
naturopathy and herbal medicine have sought statutory recognition in countries such as 30 
Canada (Kelner et al., 2006), Australia (Baer, 2006), the USA (Baer et al., 1998; Saks, 2003) 31 
and the UK (Saks, 2015; Cant & Sharma, 1996). This has not always been the case, however. 32 
It was only in the second half of the 20th century that the state’s interest in CAM started to 33 
increase (Saks, 2015), and that new professional groups such as CAM practitioners emerged 34 
and attempted to pressure the state into legitimising their claims (Baggott, 2004; 35 
Timmermans & Berg, 2003). The success of the legitimacy claims of CAM within orthodox 36 
healthcare has crucially depended on the support of the modern state (Kelner et al., 2006; 37 
Saks, 2003). 38 
The pressure to legitimise CAM therapies has also come from bodies working at a 39 
supranational level. The World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Council of Europe have 40 
encouraged states in the West to establish an adequate legal framework for CAM and to 41 
integrate it into their national healthcare systems. The success of this strategy has been helped 42 
by many Western governments focusing their health policies on a public health agenda, hence 43 
paying attention not only to ill-health and disease but also to providing the conditions for 44 
maintaining a healthy population (Hunter, 2003). As a result, a number of Western states 45 
have stopped dismissing CAM and become more sympathetic to the aspirations of CAM 46 
practitioners.  47 
In Portugal, little consideration has been given by social researchers to the process of 48 
legitimating CAM and the interaction between CAM practitioners, the state, political parties 49 
and the medical profession. This interaction is of particular interest for two main reasons: 50 
firstly, statutory regulation has been one of the main resources used by CAM practitioners to 51 
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acquire legitimacy within orthodox healthcare; secondly, however, the idiosyncratic way in 52 
which CAM legislation has been enacted in Portugal since the late 1990s reflects the difficult 53 
bargaining relationship between the state, the medical profession and CAM, and has resulted 54 
in a delay in CAM legislation. 55 
In light of the above it is important to establish the extent to which the Portuguese state and 56 
the medical profession have been sympathetic towards the acceptance of CAM practitioners’ 57 
aspirations within orthodox healthcare. This requires an analysis of the specific political 58 
context within which CAM practitioners have operated and the role of the Portuguese state in 59 
facilitating or constraining the success of their professional strategies. The analysis will begin 60 
in the late 1990s, when the CAM regulation process, underway at the time of writing, began. 61 
 
1.1. The field of countervailing powers 62 
Despite the overall increase of state interest in CAM in Western countries, the regulation of 63 
CAM has involved country-specific dynamics and in many cases has been the result of 64 
strategic power relations between interest groups over an extended period of time. In order to 65 
analyse these power relations, a sociological approach which sees these groups as operating 66 
within a field force of countervailing powers will be adopted (Light, 2000). 67 
Light’s concept of ‘countervailing powers’ is considered a ‘theoretical hybrid’, in that it 68 
suggests a pluralistic perspective on power in the healthcare arena, thus moving away from 69 
functionalist, Marxist and Weberian power frameworks (Riska, 2001). Light (2000: 203) 70 
refers to ‘countervailing powers’ as the interaction of ‘powerful actors in a field where they 71 
are inherently interdependent yet distinct’. That is, countervailing powers involve 72 
counteractions being taken by certain actors in order to restore the balance of power in the 73 
market. Each of these interdependent actors is competing within a certain field (health, for 74 
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example) and constantly negotiating power, status, market opportunities and money (Light, 75 
2010).  76 
Light (2010: 271) gives prominence to the power of the state which ‘… may hide unfolding 77 
tensions and countermoves [from other actors]’. Dunleavy and O’Leary’s (1987) 78 
conceptualisation of the state as a broker complements Light’s perspective on the state as a 79 
countervailing force. The state acts as a broker in that, despite being pressurised by different 80 
stakeholders, it does not just mirror society or follow the public and professional interest in a 81 
neutral way. Rather, as Greenberg (1990: 29) has emphasised, the state is ‘an independent 82 
and powerful entity capable not only of holding off powerful social forces, but of imposing 83 
its own vision and goals upon them.’ 84 
Light (1995) also addresses strategic allegiances between certain partners, as discussed 85 
below. 86 
 87 
1.2. ‘Strategic alliances’ between countervailing powers 88 
According to Light (1995), the multi-dimensional character of the countervailing parties 89 
allows for the creation of alliances between two or more parties in order to enhance their 90 
power. Within the healthcare field, for example, Degele (2005:112) has pointed out that 91 
biomedical power is not justified solely by scientific evidence of effectiveness, but is also the 92 
result of the interpenetration of ‘scientific pressure groups, professional, and socioeconomic 93 
interests’ which sponsor its dominant ideology. Goldstein (2002) has also shown how the 94 
corporate sector has capitalised on CAM, as the latter can offer potential cost savings. Low-95 
cost alternatives like CAM therapies have encouraged corporations such as private health 96 
insurance companies to extend coverage to one or another form of CAM. 97 
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In regard to the state, as Light (2010: 271) puts it, it is ‘… a constellation in itself of 98 
countervailing power groups or divisions with different functions and priorities’. Certain 99 
political parties, for example, can forge alliances with emerging occupational groups (CAM, 100 
for example) in order to challenge the political order and the orthodox healthcare system. 101 
So, in the health arena, the framework of countervailing powers enables us to analyse the 102 
‘embeddedness of the interplay between health professions and the state’ (Burau, 2014: 2) 103 
and the changes in this interplay over an extended period of time. It considers the changing 104 
tensions, alliances, interests, rhetoric and degrees of control among different actors over time. 105 
We will next look at CAM as existing in a field force of countervailing powers. 106 
 107 
1.3. CAM in a field of countervailing powers 108 
There has been relatively little empirical sociological research on CAM as an emerging and 109 
successful countervailing power in the healthcare field. Kelner et al.’s (2006) study of 110 
chiropractors and homeopaths in Ontario, Canada constitutes an original contribution to the 111 
countervailing powers model in that it shows how the social context influences the ways in 112 
which the state responds to CAM practitioners’ attempts to acquire legitimacy. As Kelner et 113 
al. (2006: 2625) affirm, ‘the interplay between the group [CAM], the other health 114 
professions, the state, and the public, determines how far an occupation can go in the 115 
professionalising process’.  116 
However, although Kelner et al. (2006) have made use of the concept of countervailing 117 
powers to place CAM within a larger institutional and cultural context, they do not pay much 118 
attention either to the state as a powerful and autonomous stakeholder or to CAM as a 119 
successful countervailing force. Rather, they explain how medicine, as the dominant interest 120 
group, interacts to constrain the progress of chiropractors and homeopaths in Canada. They 121 
6 
 
emphasise the power of the medical profession over the government: ‘if medicine can 122 
continue to convince government and the public of these arguments, these CAM occupations 123 
will be denied adequate financial resources to pursue key strategies’ (Kelner et al., 2006: 124 
2625). The Canadian state, according to Kelner et al. (2006; 2004), had been constrained by 125 
institutional and social forces and, although sympathetic to CAM, continued to act with 126 
caution in relation to CAM legitimacy. More recently, however, research (Welsh & Boon, 127 
2015) on CAM regulation in Ontario, Canada has shown that the Canadian state passed new 128 
legislation in 2013 to regulate three selected CAM therapies: traditional Chinese medicine, 129 
naturopathy and homeopathy. CAM practitioners, in turn, have found it easier to move from 130 
the margins of the healthcare system. 131 
The role of the state as a countervailing force can be illustrated by its demand for CAM to 132 
create professional umbrella bodies in order to achieve greater internal cohesion and 133 
standardised training. Usually it has been through the creation of these regulatory bodies and 134 
the application of standardised, evidence-based guidelines (Timmermans & Berg, 2003) that 135 
government authorities have enacted the regulation of CAM. This has been highlighted in the 136 
case of the British state’s response to acupuncture and homeopathy, which are the most 137 
professionalised CAM therapies in Britain, after osteopathy and chiropractic (Cant & 138 
Sharma, 1996). Similar state demands for organisational cohesion and standardisation of 139 
CAM can be found in other countries such as Canada – in particular, regarding naturopaths, 140 
acupuncturists and homeopaths (Gilmour et al., 2002) – and the USA – regarding 141 
acupuncture (Baer et al., 1998; Goldstein, 2002). 142 
As for the medical profession, whilst it appears that it still responds to CAM with 143 
exclusionary and demarcationary strategies – for example, by expressing concerns about 144 
scientific evidence for CAM – it has tended increasingly to reduce its resistance to CAM 145 
(Kelner et al., 2006, Cant & Sharma, 1996). Saks (1995) illustrated this shift in medicine’s 146 
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reception of CAM in the case of acupuncture in Britain by showing that, by the mid-1970s, 147 
this therapy had moved from a position of rejection to one of increasing medical 148 
incorporation. In the same vein, Cant and Sharma (1996) showed how the incorporationist 149 
strategy of the medical profession has meant a loss of professional autonomy for British 150 
homeopathy. Baer (2004) in turn has portrayed acupuncture and homeopathy in the USA as 151 
professionalised and partially professionalised heterodox medical systems respectively, 152 
which have been granted legitimacy at the cost of a subtle process of co-option or absorption 153 
by biomedicine. 154 
From a countervailing power theory perspective, it seems that in the aforementioned 155 
countries, CAM, the state and the medical profession have negotiated for influence in 156 
healthcare and have acted as countervailing forces, simultaneously opposing and allying with 157 
each other. With this in mind, in this paper we assess: (1) the degree to which CAM 158 
practitioners have influenced policy-making in Portugal and thus acted as a countervailing 159 
source of power, and (2) the extent to which the Portuguese state has sustained CAM 160 
practitioners’ attempts to acquire legitimacy within orthodox healthcare. Third, and finally, 161 
we will also consider possible changes in the medical profession’s view of CAM practice and 162 
CAM practitioners. 163 
 164 
2. Methods 165 
 166 
2.1. Data collection 167 
The study presented here is part of a wider research project exploring the relationship 168 
between CAM, the medical profession and the state in Portugal. The main sources of data 169 
were in-depth interviews with medical doctors and medically qualified and non-medically 170 
qualified acupuncturists and homeopaths, and documents. Documents were used because they 171 
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provide a key source of information on historical and political processes such as CAM 172 
statutory regulation in Portugal.  173 
In this paper, attention will be focused only on documentary data. The data were mostly 174 
generated by systematic searches of information on Web search engines such as Google, 175 
published between the late 1990s and 2015. The first author used key search phrases such as 176 
‘CAM regulation in Portugal’, ‘CAM and the medical profession’ and ‘non-conventional 177 
therapeutics and the Portuguese state’. Other documents were obtained first-hand by the first 178 
author from clinical settings and interviewees. Documents searched and obtained included 179 
specialised journals and magazines like the Portuguese Medical Council’s Journal, 180 
newspapers, letters, legislation, official reports from governmental bodies and professional 181 
associations, and audio materials such as radio interviews. 182 
 The authors focused mainly on documentary data from CAM actors and institutions, medical 183 
actors and institutions, and the state. Although the authors recognise that supranational 184 
agencies play a potential role in CAM legislation, the study reported here focuses on a 185 
national rather than a supranational level of analysis, and so systematic data collection from 186 
supranational agencies was not considered. In the same vein, the authors acknowledge the 187 
potential worldwide importance of the general public as advocates of CAM legislation, 188 
although in Portugal grassroots CAM movements have been weak, so systematic data 189 
collection addressing this actor was not undertaken.  190 
 191 
2.2. Documentary analysis  192 
As Prior (2008) acknowledges, documents are not just receptacles of content. They are 193 
‘social facts’ manufactured in certain circumstances, contexts or social settings. They not 194 
only describe an event in a neutral way, but also help to create it; they are ‘acts of persuasion’ 195 
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(Coffey, 2013: 372) which seek to accomplish specific goals (Bryman, 2016). The research 196 
presented here was concerned with the role of interests, values and professional ideologies in 197 
the publicly expressed testimonies of different actors in regard to the regulation of CAM. It 198 
also concerned itself with ambiguities and inconsistencies in these actors’ testimonies in 199 
order to capture any changes in their views on CAM regulation. This means that we should 200 
take into account the language and discourse employed by social institutions and actors over 201 
time. Therefore, the first author adopted a ‘sceptical reading’ (Gill, 2000) and looked at the 202 
vocabulary, phrases and discourse of agents as rhetorical devices for acquiring an 203 
authoritative voice.  204 
This method is usually referred to as critical discourse analysis, which searches for a purpose 205 
behind the manner in which something is said and seeks to understand how discourse is 206 
implicated in relations of power. As Bryman (2016: 534) puts it: ‘discourse is a way of 207 
constituting a particular view of social reality. ... [And so] choices are made regarding the 208 
most appropriate way of presenting it’. For example, one way of uncovering hidden interests, 209 
values and ideologies in the discourses and language used in CAM regulation was by paying 210 
particular attention to opposing and contrasting ideas and the varied names used for CAM 211 
therapies in the documents over time, as shown in the findings section. Furthermore, since the 212 
authors looked at discourse as a source of power, Light’s countervailing power theory was 213 
shown to be an appropriate framework for guiding the analysis. The first author analysed the 214 
documentary data by hand. 215 
 216 
2.3. Ethics 217 
Ethical approval for this research study was obtained from the Ethics Committee of the 218 
Centre for Criminology and Sociology, Royal Holloway, University of London. Particular 219 
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attention was paid to the credibility, authenticity and representativeness of the documentary 220 
data. 221 
 222 
2.4. Terminology 223 
In this research, CAM refers to a broad set of healthcare practices that are not part of a 224 
country’s own tradition (WHO, 2001: 1). ‘Orthodox medicine’, in turn, is used 225 
interchangeably with ‘biomedicine’ and refers to institutionalised medicine grounded in 226 
scientific logic and an evidence-based ethos which has political legitimacy (Saks, 2003). 227 
We now turn to the presentation of the main findings on the history of the regulatory process 228 
of CAM in Portugal. 229 
 230 
3. The process of CAM legislation in Portugal 231 
Portugal became a semi-presidential democracy following the transition from a dictatorship 232 
in 1974 to the proclamation of the new Constitution in 1976 (Neto & Lobo, 2012). The 233 
country’s semi-presidential regime is legitimised, according to Neto and Lobo (2012), 234 
through the power of the Portuguese President in the political process. The President shares 235 
considerable influence with parliament which s/he can dissolve and whose legislation s/he 236 
can veto. 237 
The Portuguese central government, through the Ministry of Health, is responsible for 238 
developing, overseeing, evaluating and implementing health policy, whether it is related to  239 
public (National Health Service) or private healthcare (Barros et al., 2011). The Ministry of 240 
Health contains several departments, including the Directorate-General of Health (DGS), a 241 
key department concerned with health policy-making, regulation and supervision of 242 




3.1. State support for CAM legislation in the late 1990s 245 
The new CAM legislation in Portugal is the result of an unprecedented increase in 246 
governmental interest in CAM since 1996. Table 1 shows the sequence of main events from 247 
1996 to September 1999. These events show evidence of a change in the relationship between 248 
the Portuguese state and CAM. 249 
Table 1. Timeline of the first political moves in relation to CAM legislation in Portugal 250 
16th April 1996 
A working group on CAM legislation is set up under the remit of 
the DGS 
16th March 1999 The DGS’s working group submits a CAM report to the DGS 
29th July 1999 
A proposed Draft on the Medical Act is approved by the Council 
of Ministers 
24th September 1999 
The proposed Draft on the Medical Act is vetoed by the President 
of the Republic 
 251 
In 1996 a report on the legal status of CAM worldwide and in Portugal in particular was 252 
produced by a working group made up of representatives appointed by the Ministry of 253 
Health. In March 1999, under the left-of-centre Socialist Party’s government with António 254 
Guterres as Prime Minister, the DGS published this report. The publication of this report was 255 
very controversial and deserves to be explored in more detail. Although the report mentions 256 
the National Federation of Natural Alternative Medicine’s Associations (FENAMAN), an 257 
umbrella body for CAM associations in Portugal, as the main proponent of setting up the 258 
aforementioned working group on CAM, the latter group was only formed of representatives 259 
of the DGS, the Medical and the Pharmaceutical Councils, the Directorate-General of Higher 260 
Education, and the Department of Human Resources for Health, thus excluding any CAM 261 
representatives. 262 
The DGS report on CAM represents the beginning of CAM regulation in Portugal in a variety 263 
of ways. First, it embraces a public health policy agenda by stating the need to explore other 264 
‘knowledge areas’ in health besides the one propounded by biomedicine, areas which can be 265 
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either complementary or alternative to conventional medicine. The report identifies five 266 
CAM therapies: acupuncture, homeopathy, osteopathy, chiropractic and phytotherapy. 267 
Second, the report is sympathetic to the professionalisation of CAM practitioners, pointing to 268 
the need for CAM credentialism and for an appropriate CAM curriculum to combat 269 
fragmentation and achieve greater cohesion. Third, the report mentions the crucial role of the 270 
state in the successful integration of CAM into mainstream healthcare and the protection of 271 
individuals’ health. As the report states: 272 
There was an overall agreement among the members of the working group that the 273 
quality of CAM education should be raised through the setting up of high standard 274 
courses and through the accreditation of those professionals with appropriate 275 
credentials. Therefore, an attempt to regulate these [CAM] therapies by statute should 276 
be undertaken, in order to fight against the current anarchy [in CAM’s practice] (DGS, 277 
1999: 41-42). 278 
Finally, the report calls for the setting up of a committee with representatives of the Ministry 279 
of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Medical and Pharmaceutical Councils, and CAM 280 
associations, which should be tasked with drawing up statutory regulation for CAM and 281 
CAM practitioners (DGS, 1999). 282 
Not surprisingly, this report was well received by the representatives of CAM associations, as 283 
it was in line with CAM’s interests. Nevertheless, criticism of the ‘scandalous lack of CAM 284 
representatives’ (O Dia, 1999: 11) within the working group was evident. 285 
Meanwhile, the Portuguese Medical Council (Ordem dos Médicos) (PMC) tried to persuade 286 
the state to reject the government’s proposal for CAM regulation, without success. As the 287 
DGS report itself discloses, most of the working group’s meetings were held ‘… without the 288 
presence of all the appointees due to a variety of reasons, and some of the appointees were 289 
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substituted by others’ (DGS, 1999: 4). In the end, all the appointees agreed and subscribed to 290 
the report, apart from the PMC’s representative, who disagreed with its proposal for CAM 291 
regulation. As Germano de Sousa, the PMC’s chairman at the time, stated in an interview 292 
released by the newspaper Primeiro de Janeiro in July 1999: 293 
We [the PMC] will assess it [the DGS report] in due course but I believe that any 294 
conclusive evaluation [of the report] is far from being achieved. … Specifically, the big 295 
concern here is the need to protect Portuguese citizens from the manoeuvring of groups 296 
[CAM] without any scientific basis to treat diseases ... In other words, the money 297 
currently spent on health is precious and so cannot be wasted on [CAM] practices 298 
which are not scientifically proven. There are some ‘laboratories’ which manufacture 299 
so-called homeopathic drugs but the latter are just water which have been sold like gold 300 
(Bessa, 1999: 5). 301 
This statement makes evident the reasons for the PMC’s rejection of the DGS report, with 302 
specific reference to homeopathic drugs. The disparaging way in which the PMC dismissed 303 
CAM and CAM practitioners on the grounds of lack of scientific evidence for their 304 
treatments is noteworthy. This act of challenging state support for CAM legislation was 305 
accompanied by the PMC’s submission to the government in July 1999 of a proposed Draft 306 
of the Medical Act, requiring that everyone performing medical acts must be registered with 307 
the PMC. 308 
This Draft provided the basis of discord between the government and the medical profession. 309 
Although approved by the Council of Ministers, the Draft was vetoed by Jorge Sampaio, the 310 
President of the Republic, who pronounced it unconstitutional to impose restrictions on who 311 
could treat patients. 312 
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So one can see that, by the end of 1999, the DGS report and the presidential veto nurtured 313 
CAM interests and resisted the medical profession’s attempts to retain its power by trying to 314 
legislate on who could provide health services. These events provide evidence of a change in 315 
the relationship between the Portuguese state and CAM. Furthermore, the support of the 316 
DGS, a state institution, and the countervailing power of CAM practitioners, created 317 
favourable conditions for the first major political attempt to regulate CAM by statute. This 318 
took place at the end of 1999, as we will see next. 319 
 320 
3.2. The first attempt at CAM regulation 321 
A brief description of the Portuguese parliamentary process is essential in order to understand 322 
the regulation of CAM in the country. Four political parties have dominated the Parliament: 323 
the left-of-centre Socialist Party (PS); the right-of-centre Social-Democratic Party (PSD); the 324 
left-wing Communist Party (PCP), and the right-of-centre Democratic and Social Centre – 325 
People's Party (CDS-PP). Other parties with a smaller share of seats in parliament are the 326 
left-wing Ecologist Party, ‘The Greens’ (PEV), and the Left wing Bloc (BE). The Left Bloc 327 
party is one of the youngest parties, with nineteen MPs in parliament out of 230 in 2015, and 328 
is popular for its proposals on controversial issues such as domestic violence and abortion, 329 
women’s and gay rights, immigration, genetically modified food, and CAM regulation. 330 
Table 2. Timeline of the first attempt at CAM legislation 331 
7th December 1999 
The Left Bloc Party (BE) submits a CAM Bill (Projeto de Lei nº 
34/VII – Regulamentação das Medicinas não Convencionais) 
25th October 2000 
The Socialist Party (PS) submits a CAM Bill (Projeto de Lei nº 
320/VIII – Lei do Enquadramento Base das Medicinas não 
Convencionais) 
July 2001 
The PMC presents its official position on the BE and PS Bills on 
CAM legislation by submitting a report to the Commission of 
Health and Drugs 
August 2001 The Portuguese Medical Society of Acupuncture is founded 
January 2002 
Prime Minister António Guterres resigns and parliament is 
dissolved 




The Left Bloc Party was the first party to submit a CAM Bill to parliament in December 1999 333 
(Projeto de Lei nº 34/VII). Nearly one year later, in October 2000, the Socialist Party, the 334 
dominant left-of-centre party, also submitted a CAM Bill to parliament (Projeto de Lei nº 335 
320/VIII). Both Bills claimed that there was an urgent need to begin the national statutory 336 
regulation of CAM. The main arguments in both documents were: lay use of CAM has 337 
increased in many Western countries including Portugal; the need for CAM regulation has 338 
become a reality; medical interest in CAM has risen; and therapeutic pluralism has become 339 
increasingly popular. 340 
As one can see, both Bills embraced ‘upstream’ public health interventions (Hunter, 2003), 341 
by stimulating policy change through CAM regulation. Submission of CAM bills by both the 342 
BE and the PS was thus suggestive of a strategic alignment with CAM’s interests.  343 
Meanwhile, in an interview for the Portuguese TSF radio station (18/10/2000), Germano de 344 
Sousa, the PMC’s chairman, dismissed the PS Bill on CAM regulation by saying that it was 345 
‘completely unnecessary’ and admitted ironically to not understanding the rush towards the 346 
regulation of CAM since there were ‘… many other issues that the parliament should be 347 
concerned about’. 348 
In 2001, the PMC presented its official position on the BE and PS Bills on CAM regulation 349 
by submitting a report (SRNOM, 2001) to the Parliamentary Committee on Health and 350 
Drugs. The report outlined the PMC’s position on the Bills as follows: 351 
(1) The use of the term ‘non-conventional medicines’ was advocated. According to the report 352 
(SRNOM, 2001: 51), ‘… there is only one medicine and the efficacy of any self-proclaimed 353 
non-conventional therapy, once scientifically proven, will be incorporated immediately into 354 
the medical canon’. The PMC proposes therefore to apply the term ‘complementary 355 
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therapeutics’ to these therapies; 356 
(2) Representatives from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and the PMC and 357 
from each CAM therapy should be included in the technical committee. Furthermore, CAM 358 
representatives should be individuals with recognised merit within their therapy and should 359 
have CAM accreditation by the European Union; 360 
(3) Neither Bill makes a clear distinction between those therapies backed by scientific 361 
evidence and those which lack any scientific basis, referred to as ‘quackery’; only 362 
acupuncture, osteopathy and chiropractic should be regulated, since these are the only ones 363 
supported by scientific evidence for specific medical conditions; 364 
(4) The process of diagnosis and prescribing should be under medical jurisdiction, and 365 
clinical autonomy should not be accorded to CAM practitioners; 366 
(5) Only medical doctors should refer patients to CAM practitioners where appropriate, while 367 
the latter should be aware of the limitations of their practice. In cases of acute illness, for 368 
example, CAM practitioners should immediately refer patients to scientific medicine; 369 
(6) Finally, CAM practitioners should not be allowed to manufacture any products or 370 
instruments prescribed or used for therapeutic purposes. 371 
Although the PMC had traditionally rejected CAM, this last report indicates the endorsement 372 
of ‘CAM poaching’ (Boon et al., 2004), i.e. the incorporation of ‘the ‘best’ or ‘scientifically 373 
proven’ CAM treatments within the jurisdiction of medicine in a bid to eliminate the need for 374 
CAM practitioners (Boon et al., 2004: 129). For example, CAM therapies are redefined as 375 
‘complementary therapeutics’, in contrast to the WHO’s recommended term ‘complementary 376 
and alternative medicine’. Furthermore, acupuncture, osteopathy and chiropractic are 377 
acknowledged by the PMC report as CAM modalities deserving recognition due to their basis 378 
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in scientific evidence for certain treatments. Scientific evidence is therefore used in this 379 
report to legitimise some aspects of CAM. Having established their scientific credentials, 380 
CAM modalities are expected to transform themselves into ‘just one more therapeutic 381 
resource’ which can then be incorporated into the biomedical canon (Boon et al., 2004). 382 
Furthermore, the report can be seen as an attempt to protect established medical practices, 383 
such as diagnosis and prescribing, by advocating that these practices should remain under the 384 
authority of orthodox medicine. Finally, the report shows that the Council has moved from 385 
refusing to be involved in a future CAM Committee to a more conciliatory position, in which 386 
they would participate alongside representatives of mainstream healthcare and the six CAM 387 
modalities. 388 
This 2001 medical report therefore reflected the strategy chosen by the elite of the medical 389 
profession to counteract governmental interest in CAM. It involves an attempt to move from 390 
a position of rejection to one of ‘incorporating’ CAM (Saks, 1995), by opening the door to 391 
some of CAM’s ‘scientifically based’ therapies, namely acupuncture, osteopathy and 392 
chiropractic. Also, the claims presented in this medical report appear to have impacted on the 393 
new CAM legislation itself, as we will show subsequently. Finally, the PMC report was 394 
followed by the foundation of the Portuguese Medical Society of Acupuncture in August 395 
2001, which was charged with preparing a proposal for a medical competency in ‘medical 396 
acupuncture’. 397 
However, neither the BE nor the PS Bill on CAM gained final approval. In January 2002, 398 
following a disastrous result for the Socialist Party in the local elections, Prime Minister 399 
António Guterres resigned and so did the government. In such a politically unstable climate, 400 
achieving a parliamentary consensus on ‘marginal’ issues such as CAM regulation was 401 
unlikely and in April 2002 both Bills expired.  402 
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One can see here the countervailing divisions emerging within the Portuguese state itself, as 403 
represented by the political parties. In an interview for TSF radio (7/01/2002), the BE Party’s 404 
leader Francisco Louçã mentioned the close partnership between the right-of-centre Social-405 
Democratic Party and the PMC on this matter, who he claimed ‘were lobbying the regulators 406 
[not to support CAM regulation]’ and also neglecting ‘patients’ rights in favour of business’. 407 
The Social-Democratic Party was even accused by Louçã of taking advantage of political 408 
instability in the country by lobbying MPs to vote against this move.  409 
In summary, the first attempt at CAM regulation in Portugal failed as a result of the use of 410 
countervailing powers by the political parties at a time of short-lived political instability. We 411 
will now turn to the analysis of the second attempt at CAM legislation. 412 
 413 
3.3. The second attempt at CAM regulation 414 
Table 3. Timeline of the second attempt at CAM legislation in Portugal 415 
21st May 2002 
The Left Bloc Party submits a new CAM Bill (Projeto de Lei nº 27/IX 
– Regime Jurídico das Terapêuticas não Convencionais) 
May 2002 Acupuncture is recognised by the PMC as a ‘medical competency’ 
18th March 2003 
The Socialist Party (PS) submits a new CAM Bill (Projeto de Lei nº 
263/IX – Lei do Enquadramento Base das Medicinas não 
Convencionais) 
15th July 2003 
The Portuguese parliament passes a new Act (nº 45/2003 – Lei do 
Enquadramento Base das Terapêuticas não Convencionais) 
22nd August 2003 The Act nº 45/2003 is issued in the Diary of the Republic 
 416 
In April 2002, following Guterres’ resignation, the right-of-centre PSD Party fought and won 417 
the general election under the leadership of Durão Barroso. The following month the Left 418 
Bloc Party re-introduced the debate on CAM regulation by submitting a new Bill, which was 419 
largely based on the previous one (Projeto de Lei nº 27/IX). This revived Bill reinforced the 420 
need for CAM regulation by drawing on the WHO’s reports on CAM. It also contained 421 
conceptual developments such as replacement of the word ‘medicines’ with the word 422 
‘therapeutics’ in the title. Meanwhile, in the same month (May 2002), the PMC approved the 423 
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grounds for a proposal for a competency in ‘medical acupuncture’ for medical doctors, 424 
submitted by the recently created Portuguese Medical Society of Acupuncture. 425 
Almost one year later, in March 2003, the PS Party also introduced a new Bill on CAM 426 
regulation to Parliament, which was similar to its previous submission (Projeto de Lei nº 427 
263/IX). In June 2003 a reviewed and combined text of these two documents was debated 428 
and voted for unanimously by all MPs. The next stage was the creation of a Decree, its 429 
endorsement, and the drafting of a new Act 45/2003. 430 
In sum, the second attempt at CAM legislation and its successful outcome, with the creation 431 
of the new Act, was undertaken over a very short period and suggests a convergence of the 432 
positions of the different political parties regarding CAM legislation. In this sense, this 433 
second attempt helped to solidify the allegiances between the political parties, the state and 434 
CAM and demonstrates a clear shift in the state’s position towards CAM. We will now turn 435 
to the analysis of the content of the new Act 45/2003. 436 
 437 
3.4. The content of Act 45/2003 438 
This new Act put six CAM therapies on the road to statutory regulation. It contains some 439 
important aspects that are worth mentioning. First, it reflects the influence of the PMC. For 440 
example, the new Act suggests a new and specific socio-political concept – ‘non-441 
conventional therapeutics’ – discarding the use of the term ‘medicine’. This new term has 442 
become commonplace within CAM political and professional circles since 2003 and is 443 
applied to those therapeutics which ‘… depart on different philosophical grounds from 444 
conventional medicine and use specific processes of diagnosis as well as their own therapies’ 445 
(ARP, 2003:5391). 446 
The definition of ‘non-conventional therapeutics’ is legitimated in the Act by referring to the 447 
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reports of the WHO on CAM. By drawing on the WHO’s definition of CAM, this new Act 448 
appears to demarcate CAM from conventional medicine as well as to encourage CAM’s 449 
occupational closure. For example, this CAM definition legitimates CAM therapies as 450 
different from biomedicine and as having professional autonomy from the medical 451 
profession. However, despite this aspect favourable to CAM, the document emphasises the 452 
importance of ethical standards for CAM, some of which were influenced by the PMC’s 453 
earlier claims, such as the promotion of scientific evidence-based research as a way to 454 
achieve higher quality, efficacy and effectiveness. 455 
The Act still states that only professionals holding legal and accredited qualifications can 456 
practise CAM. However, unlike the PMC’s position, this new Act also recognises the clinical 457 
autonomy of CAM practitioners. Therefore, the potential subordination of CAM to the 458 
medical profession is not explicitly contemplated in the new CAM legislation. Despite being 459 
in favour of CAM, this specific clause on CAM’s clinical autonomy has turned CAM 460 
legislation into a much longer and messier process, as the autonomy of CAM practitioners 461 
remains a controversial issue within medical orthodoxy. 462 
With the creation of the new Act 45/2003, a committee charged with CAM regulation was set 463 
up. We now turn to a more detailed look at this committee. 464 
 465 
3.5. The ad hoc committee on CAM legislation 466 
There are two kinds of parliamentary committee in Portuguese government: standing 467 
committees, which are specialised committees with permanent jurisdiction over specific 468 
matters; and ad hoc committees, established for a limited period of time and charged with a 469 
specific function which usually culminates in the presentation of a report. Parliamentary 470 
committees and their scope are defined by the Assembly of the Republic and their members 471 
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are appointed by all the Parliamentary groups (in accordance with their proportional share of 472 
seats in the Assembly). 473 
In May 2004, a new ad hoc Committee (CTCTNC) was tasked with regulating CAM. The 474 
dynamics within this new Committee and the timeline of the governmental and political 475 
actions in relation to it are worth noting. 476 
Table 4: Timeline of the governmental and political actions of the ad hoc Committee on CAM 477 
28th May 2004 
An ad hoc Committee is set up and tasked with  regulating  CAM 
(Despacho Conjunto no 327/2004) 
December 2007 
The Committee hands in its proposals on CAM regulation to the 
DGS 
June/July 2008 
Public discussion of the Committee’s proposals on CAM 
regulation takes place 
31st December 2008 
The material from the public discussion is sent to the Committee 
which is charged with writing a final report  
17th October 2009 
The Left Bloc Party (BE) submits Query no 299/XI/1 to the 
Ministry of Health 
22nd April 2010 The Ministry of Health replies to the BE’s Query no 299/XI/1 
29th July 2011 
The BE submits a Resolution Project (Projecto de Resolução no 
42/XII/1a) 
9th November 2011 
The Assembly of the Republic publishes Resolution 146/2011, 
advising the government to complete the process of  regulating 
CAM 
 478 
This ad hoc Committee on CAM initially comprised 16 members who were appointed by the 479 
DGS: six CAM representatives, seven healthcare professionals and academics recognised by 480 
the state, and three representatives of government. It took around four years for the public 481 
discussion of the Committee’s proposals on CAM regulation to be completed. The 482 
Committee witnessed the withdrawal of some conventional healthcare appointees, as well as 483 
several disagreements among CAM representatives and CAM associations. This showed not 484 
only signs of fragmentation within CAM, but also internal divisions within the state.  485 
In October 2009, the Left Bloc Party (BE) pressurised the Ministry of Health by asking about 486 
the date for publishing the post-public discussion report on CAM regulation and the 487 
implementation of Act 45/2003. In July 2011, the BE submitted a Resolution Project to 488 
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parliament, recommending the implementation of Act 45/2003 (Projeto de Resolução no 489 
42/XII/1a). This document emphasised the long delay in CAM regulation in Portugal (at the 490 
time, eight years had passed since the enactment of Act 45/2003) as well as the absence of the 491 
ad hoc Committee’s chairman, who had resigned. This Resolution Project was approved and 492 
published by the Assembly of the Republic, which advised the government to complete the 493 
process of CAM regulation. 494 
Meanwhile, the PMC opened itself up to homeopathy, by hosting in March 2012 at its 495 
headquarters the first seminar for scientific research in homeopathy, organised by the 496 
Homeopathic Society of Portugal. The latter had been founded in 2003 by a small group of 497 
medical doctors and pharmacists who defined homeopathy as a ‘medical approach’. 498 
It took almost one year from the approval of the BE’s Resolution for the government to take 499 
action on regulation of CAM, as we will see next. 500 
3.6. The replacement of Act 45/2003 by Act 71/2013 501 
Table 5. The main governmental and political activities between 2012 and 2014 502 
22nd November 2012 
The DGS presents a Bill on CAM to the Committee (Proposta de 
Lei 111/XII) 
2nd September 2013 The Act nº 71/2013 is listed in the Diary of the Republic 
3rd February 2014 
The competencies of a second ad hoc Committee are established  
(Portaria no 25/2014) 
 503 
At the end of 2012, the government announced a Bill proposing regulation of CAM (DGS, 504 
2012), and made clear the need for the creation of professional credentials for CAM 505 
practitioners as well as the online registration of credentialed practitioners in the country, 506 
under the remit of The Central Administration of the Health System (ACSS), a public 507 
institution supervised by the Ministry of Health (TSF, 1/02/2012). Furthermore, this Bill 508 
clearly states that CAM professionals cannot claim that their actions are curative. The 509 
announcement of the Bill was subject to many criticisms by the CAM community, which 510 
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argued that it ignored the work done over the years by the ad hoc Committee and usurped  the 511 
Committee’s right to regulate CAM. 512 
The main aim of this CAM Bill was to update and regulate Act 45/2003. It was debated in 513 
parliament and voted for by the PSD, the PS and the CDS-PP parties, with abstentions from 514 
the BE, the PCP and the PEV parties. In September 2013, a new Act 71/2013 was created. 515 
Unsurprisingly, a new ad hoc Committee was created under the new Act which superseded its 516 
predecessor. Finally, Traditional Chinese Medicine was added to the list of CAM therapies to 517 
be included in the legislation. This last aspect amazed the PMC, who, in a letter to the 518 
President of the Republic, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, declared that they had not been consulted 519 
about this therapy ‘... which was included at last minute, quietly, in the [DGS] Bill 111/XII, 520 
to avoid  the danger of rejection’ (PMC, 2013: 36). Again, the main objection of the PMC to 521 
the inclusion of Traditional Chinese Medicine concerned its terminology, with the PMC 522 
proposing it should be replaced by ‘Traditional Chinese Therapies’. This proposal was 523 
refused by the government and the terminology ‘Traditional Chinese Medicine’ remained in 524 
the Bill. 525 
 526 
3.7. A higher education degree in CAM 527 
In October 2014, the government published the competencies set up by the ad hoc Committee 528 
for the seven CAM therapies included in the Act 71/2013. More recently, in June 2015, the 529 
government published the educational standards of five out of the seven therapies included in 530 
the new Act. These documents recognise acupuncture, osteopathy, chiropractic, phytotherapy 531 
and naturopathy – thus excluding homeopathy and traditional Chinese medicine – as CAM 532 
therapies and set the educational standards for becoming a CAM professional, which involve 533 




Table 6. The main governmental and political activities between 2014 and 2015  536 
8th October 2014 
The competencies of CAM are ‘set up’ (Portarias no 207-A, B, C, 
D, E, F, G/2014) 
5th June 2015 
The educational standards for acupuncture, osteopathy, 
chiropractic, phytotherapy and naturopathy are established 
(Portarias no 172-B, C, D, E, F/2015) 
 537 
4. Discussion 538 
This paper has explored (1) the extent to which CAM practitioners have influenced policy-539 
making in Portugal and thus acted as a countervailing power; (2) the degree to which the 540 
Portuguese political system has sustained CAM practitioners’ attempts to be included in 541 
orthodox healthcare; and (3) changes in the medical profession’s position towards CAM and 542 
CAM practitioners.  543 
We started by depicting the role of the government as having sown the seeds of CAM 544 
regulation in the late 1990s through publication of a report showing the need for CAM 545 
legislation, following pressure from FENAMAN. This governmental action encouraged 546 
unprecedented political interest in and contestation over CAM statutory regulation, and 547 
provoked countervailing actions from the political parties, the medical profession and CAM. 548 
The findings outlined here suggest that these countervailing actions resulted in the creation of 549 
Act 45/2003 which regulated six CAM therapies, later replaced by Act 71/2013, which 550 
updated the former and regulated seven CAM therapies. By creating these Acts, the 551 
Portuguese state has shown itself to be sympathetic to CAM legitimacy, indicating that 552 
CAM’s relationship with the state has clearly changed. 553 
CAM practitioners have acted as a source of power and a countervailing force in relation to 554 
the medical profession and the state, in that they have demonstrated significant influence on 555 
the policy-making process. The New Act 71/2013, although calling for a scientific model of 556 
CAM, is sympathetic to CAM practitioners. It has legitimised CAM’s quest for professional 557 
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autonomy as long as it complies with the standards of a ‘profession’ by seeking 558 
professionalisation, and has not restricted the practice of CAM to the medical profession, as 559 
the latter wished. Furthermore, if this statutory regulation is completed in the near future, 560 
Portugal will be at the forefront of CAM regulation in comparison with other Western 561 
countries. 562 
At the same time, the medical establishment’s reaction to CAM’s attempts at statutory 563 
regulation has changed. At the end of the 1990s, the PMC at first resisted CAM practitioners’ 564 
attempts to promote the issue of CAM through the political system, on the grounds that CAM 565 
lacked a basis in scientific evidence. In 2001, the Medical Council changed tack and 566 
attempted to exert its ‘biomedical gaze’ over CAM legislation, despite its generally hostile 567 
position on such legislation. It published a report advocating the incorporation of 568 
‘scientifically proven’ CAM therapies within medicine. In 2002 it accepted acupuncture as a 569 
‘medical competency’ and has increasingly addressed homeopathic practice among medical 570 
doctors. Overall, the medical establishment’s relationship with CAM has changed, moving 571 
from rejecting all CAM therapies to incorporating selected ones, thus following countries 572 
such as the UK (Saks, 1995), the USA (Baer, 2004), Canada (Kelner et al., 2004) and New 573 
Zealand (Dew, 2000). In the same manner as observed by Saks (1998) in relation to British 574 
society in the late 1990s, it can be argued that in 21st-century Portuguese society the medical 575 
profession has maintained professional dominance and authority through incorporation of 576 
CAM. 577 
The PMC has also acted as a site of power and has influenced state policy-making. First, its 578 
claims to ownership of the word ‘medicine’ impacted on the government’s wording of the 579 
new CAM Bill, which was changed from ‘CAM’ to ‘non-conventional therapeutics’. This 580 
adopted term differs significantly from the terms used by supra-state organisations such as 581 
the WHO and the Council of Europe, in which ‘complementary and alternative medicine’ 582 
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prevails. This is suggestive of the symbolic power of language to achieve political goals and 583 
thus occupational closure. Second, the creation of the first ad hoc Committee to regulate 584 
CAM followed the advice of the PMC, giving the latter the opportunity to exert a ‘biomedical 585 
gaze’ and thus control over the Committee, with seven out of thirteen appointees of the 586 
Committee comprising conventional healthcare representatives. Finally, the new Act 71/2013 587 
adopted the rhetoric of biomedicine by stressing the need for a scientific evidence base for 588 
CAM. More recently, in 2015, the government published the educational standards for five 589 
out of seven CAM therapies, excluding homeopathy and traditional Chinese medicine from 590 
this process. Homeopathy was ruled out because of the lack of evidence of its efficacy, while 591 
traditional Chinese medicine was omitted because of the use of the word ‘medicine’ in its 592 
name. So, in Portugal, the medical profession has been strong enough to persuade the state to 593 
pay some attention to its interests, and thus to maintain biomedical dominance and the status 594 
of orthodox medicine within mainstream healthcare.  595 
Accordingly, the Portuguese government has been in a challenging position in which it must 596 
mediate between implementing guidelines formulated by supranational agencies such as the 597 
WHO, which appear sympathetic to the integration of CAM and CAM practitioners in 598 
mainstream healthcare worldwide; biomedicine’s resistance and traditional dominance; and 599 
the counteractions of CAM. It has tried to accommodate the interests of both the medical 600 
profession and CAM in an attempt to maintain its traditional relationship with the medical 601 
profession whilst simultaneously showing signs of openness to CAM. This has also been the 602 
case in other states, such as the USA (Goldstein, 2002), Australia (Baer, 2006), Britain (Saks, 603 
1995) and Canada (Kelner et al., 2004). 604 
It has furthermore been shown that the Portuguese state is itself a constellation of 605 
countervailing forces with different goals and priorities (Light, 2010). The working group on 606 
CAM legislation set up under the remit of the DGS in the late 1990s never worked efficiently 607 
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due to internal disagreements between appointees. Certain political parties forged alliances 608 
with CAM, while others supported the medical profession and the hegemony of the 609 
biomedical model in healthcare, thus creating divisions within the state itself. The work of the 610 
first ad hoc Committee to regulate CAM took place over two years due to disagreements 611 
among members who ended by resigning and abandoning the group. Subsequently, the 612 
government announced a new Bill in place of Act 45/2003, thus imposing its power and its 613 
own vision of CAM legislation (Greenberg, 1990). 614 
Above all, the Portuguese state has acted as a broker (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987), which, 615 
although constrained by the interests of the medical profession and CAM and by internal 616 
countervailing forces, has demonstrated its traditional autonomy and regulatory power. The 617 
recent announcement by the government of the new Act 71/2013, and its subsequent approval 618 
by parliament, clearly demonstrate the legislative authority of the state as well as its 619 
regulatory role in shaping health policy-making in Portugal. The power of the Portuguese 620 
state can also be seen in the current delay in CAM regulation inasmuch as, at the time of 621 
writing, the most recent CAM regulation is still underway and CAM professionals remain 622 
marginalised in Portuguese healthcare. 623 
The research reported here has looked at CAM practitioners collectively as a major player 624 
which has organised against medical dominance in order to rearrange power relations and 625 
reshape healthcare markets. The establishment of strategic alliances between CAM 626 
practitioners and the state over time and the consequent balance of power between these two 627 
actors and the medical profession, with the inclusion of CAM legislation in the political 628 
agenda, has been evident. Yet it was also evident that biomedical power remains extremely 629 
important in terms of providing directions for the regulation of CAM in Portugal. 630 
Nevertheless, by using countervailing power theory to analyse CAM’s relationship with key 631 
actors in the healthcare sector, the study presented here has highlighted the dynamic nature of 632 
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social relations in this area. For CAM practitioners, the medical profession and the state have 633 
negotiated to influence Portuguese healthcare, acting as sources of countervailing power. 634 
This process has involved simultaneously opposing and allying with each other. 635 
Consequently, the medical profession, although maintaining its power and status, may be 636 
losing its hegemonic and corporatist control over CAM legislation in the country. 637 
Above all, the research reported here has demonstrated the need to move away from both the 638 
professional dominance and the corporatist approach to healthcare and to adopt a hybrid 639 
countervailing power framework in order to better understand developments in CAM’s status 640 
and legislative change in Portugal. Future research needs to be conducted on the extent to 641 
which the regulatory role of the Portuguese state differs from that of other Western states in 642 
terms of CAM legislation. In the same vein, research is needed on how the medical 643 
profession in other Western countries views CAM legislation in comparison with its position 644 
in Portugal and the role of supranational bargaining in CAM regulation in these countries. 645 
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